Catholic University Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 4 Fall 2022

Article 7

12-2-2022

The Inconsistencies of Consent
Chunlin Leonhard
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, leonhard@loyno.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Chunlin Leonhard, The Inconsistencies of Consent, 71 Cath. U. L. Rev. 669 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol71/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Catholic Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of Catholic Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

The Inconsistencies of Consent
Cover Page Footnote
Chunlin Leonhard is the Leon Sarpy Distinguished Professor of Law at Loyola University New Orleans
College of Law. I would like to thank Loyola University New Orleans College of Law and Leon Sarpy
Professorship for their support of this research project. I am especially grateful to my research assistant
Ms. Brooke Hathaway for her competent and timely research assistance. The opinions expressed herein
are mine alone.

This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol71/iss4/7

THE INCONSISTENCIES OF CONSENT
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U.S. legal scholars have devoted a lot of attention to the role that consent has
played in laws and judicial consent jurisprudence. This essay contributes to the
discussion on consent by examining judicial approaches to determining the
existence of consent in three selected areas--contracts, tort claims involving
medical treatment, and criminal cases involving admissibility of confessions,
from the late nineteenth century until the present. This article examines how
courts have approached the basic factual question of finding consent and how
judicial approaches in those areas have evolved over time. The review shows
that the late 19th century saw courts adopting a similar approach for finding
consent across the three areas. Courts focused on observable signs of consent,
verbal or nonverbal communications, to determine existence of consent. They
found consent unless circumstances suggested that the consenting party lacked
the power to use their will. However, courts began to diverge in the early and
mid-twentieth century in their approaches to ascertaining consent. In contract
disputes, courts’ consent approach has remained static, focusing on observable
signs of consent or, in contract law parlance, “manifestations of assent.” In tort
cases involving medical treatment, courts began requiring more than observable
signs of consent; instead, courts focused on the consenting party’s access to
information and comprehension, described by scholars as the informed consent
doctrine. The judicial consent approach undertook the most dramatic change in
criminal cases involving admissibility of confessions with judicial adoption of
presumption of non-consent in custodial interrogation without the required
warnings.
This article suggests that multiple factors appear to have contributed to
divergent consent approaches across the three areas. Consent plays a different
role in contract disputes from that in medical treatment and criminal confession
cases. Courts have adopted a heightened consent inquiry in medical treatment
and criminal confession cases as responses to significant social changes and
increased public awareness of individual rights and the need to protect
individuals from potential abuses and arbitrary government power. In addition,
human cognitive biases—our flawed decision-making process, may have also
contributed to the divergence.
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INTRODUCTION
Consent permeates many different areas of U.S. laws. It has been described
as a concept with “moral magic” powers.1 Consent has been used as justification

1. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996).
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for imposing civil liability in contract law.2 It has shielded people from tort
liability when used, for example, as a defense in assault and battery cases. 3
Consent has also been used as the basis for using one’s own words against
oneself in criminal prosecutions.4
U.S. legal scholars have devoted a lot of attention to the role that consent has
played in laws and judicial consent jurisprudence.5 Some have criticized judicial
approaches to ascertaining consent.6 Some have been searching for solutions to
the perceived problems.7
This essay contributes to the discussion on consent by examining judicial
approaches to determining the existence of consent in three selected areas—
contracts, tort claims involving medical treatment, and criminal cases involving
admissibility of confessions, from the late nineteenth century until the present.8

2. Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 57, 59 (2012) [hereinafter Leonhard, Unbearable Lightness of Consent] (“Consent
has morally justified and legitimized government intervention in private contractual
relationships.”).
3. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal That Criminal Law
Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 504
(2005) (“[C]onsent turns a rape into love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into
a football tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner party.”).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Magness, 69 F.3d 872, 873 (8th Cir. 1995).
5. Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning
Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1140–42, 1155 (2019) (describing the courts’ treatment of
consent or assent as a “paradigm slip” and the modern contracts as “pseudo-contracts”); Nancy S.
Kim, Relative Consent and Contract Law, 18 NEV. L.J. 165 (2017); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing
Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 213 (2001) (arguing that “caselaw fails to consider
the reality that most people will feel compelled to allow the police to search” and “the current
doctrine of consent inherently fosters distrust of police officers as well as the judicial system”).
Social and political scientists have also examined consent from social and political perspectives.
See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 1 (1989).
6. Strauss, supra note 5, at 221 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s test for evaluating
voluntariness in consent searches); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False
Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010) (examining false confessions in forty cases).
7. The American Law Institute’s current effort at drafting the Restatement of Consumer
Contracts is one of the efforts to respond to criticism of the consent doctrine in contracts.
Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show
/consumer-contracts/#_status (last visited March 13, 2022). See also Mark E. Budnitz, The
Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts: The American Law Institute’s Impossible Dream,
32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 369, 375 (2020); Kar & Radin, supra note 5, at 1142−43 (proposing
the shared meaning analysis “to bring contract law back into coherence with its core concepts,
principles, and justifications”); Leonhard, Unbearable Lightness of Consent, supra note 2, at 85
(proposing the application of the totality of the circumstances standard to determine consent in
contract disputes).
8. This article limits its examination to the three representative areas because of
manageability issues. This article also does not intend to engage in a debate as to whether consent
is sufficient to justify imposition of liability or to excuse certain actions. For a discussion related
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This article examines how courts have approached the basic factual question of
finding consent and how judicial approaches in those areas have evolved over
time.9
The review shows that the late 19th century saw courts adopting a similar
approach for finding consent across the three areas. 10 Courts focused on
observable signs of consent, verbal or nonverbal communications, to determine
existence of consent.11 They found consent unless circumstances suggested that
the consenting party lacked the power to use their will.12
However, courts began to diverge in the early and mid-twentieth century in
their approaches to ascertaining consent. In contract disputes, courts’ consent
approach has remained static, focusing on observable signs of consent or, in
contract law parlance, “manifestations of assent.” 13 In tort cases involving
medical treatment, courts began requiring more than observable signs of
consent; instead, courts focused on the consenting party’s access to information
and comprehension, described by scholars as the informed consent doctrine.14
The judicial consent approach undertook the most dramatic change in criminal
cases involving admissibility of confessions with judicial adoption of
presumption of non-consent in custodial interrogation without the required
warnings.15
This essay begins with a discussion of types of verbal and non-verbal
expressions of consent, drawing from social science studies on human
communications. Part II examines judicial approaches to finding consent in the
three selected areas. Part III offers some possible explanations for the divergent
approaches.
This article suggests that multiple factors appear to have contributed to
divergent consent approaches across the three areas. Consent plays a different

to the scope of consent, see a series of articles written by Professor Vera Bergelson. Vera
Bergelson, The 2008 David J. Stoffer Lecture: Autonomy, Dignity, and Consent to Harm, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (2008); Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of
Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165 (2007).
9. This article continues my previous research related to the consent doctrine in contract law.
See Leonhard, Unbearable Lightness of Consent, supra note 2 (questioning the contract law’s
reliance on consent as justification for use of government power in favor of one contractual party);
Chunlin Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions, Cognitive Biases, and Consent in
Contract Law, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 385, 395–400 (2017) [hereinafter Leonhard, Dangerous or
Benign Legal Fictions] (identifying consent in contract law as a dangerous legal fiction).
10. See discussion infra Section II.
11. See discussion infra Section II.
12. See discussion infra Section II.
13. See discussion infra Section II(A). Tole v. Hardy, 6 Cow. 333, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826)
(finding “manifestation of assent”); Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 561, 565 (9th
Cir. 2014) (discussing whether failure to cancel a trial subscription constituted a manifestation of
assent to an arbitration provision).
14. See discussion infra Section II (B).
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See discussion infra Section II(C)(3).
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role in contract disputes from that in medical treatment and criminal confession
cases. Courts have adopted a heightened consent inquiry in medical treatment
and criminal confession cases as responses to significant social changes and
increased public awareness of individual rights and the need to protect
individuals from potential abuses and arbitrary government power. In addition,
human cognitive biases—our flawed decision-making process, may have also
contributed to the divergent approaches.
I. THE SEARCH FOR CONSENT AND ITS CHALLENGE
Let us start with the most basic question: how does a court determine when
someone has consented? Because consent is an internal mental status, the
question is easy and difficult to answer. It is easy because as human beings we
have learned how to communicate with each other through verbal and nonverbal
means.16 Courts can answer the question by examining observable verbal and
nonverbal signs to determine if someone has consented.17
The question can be difficult at the same time, however, because consent is
an internal state of mind.18 Scientific studies have shown that observable signs
sometimes may not be a true reflection of an inner mental status.19 Unable to
read people’s minds, courts must rely on observable signs, verbal and non-verbal
communications, to ascertain whether a person has consented.20 These verbal
and non-verbal communications are essentially reification of consent.

16. Lisa Slattery Rashotte, What Does That Smile Mean? The Meaning of Nonverbal
Behaviors in Social Interaction, 65 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 92, 99 (2002).
17. Heritage Roofing, LLC v. Fischer, 164 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that party orally accepted terms of written proposal when he stated, “I approve it, I want you to go
ahead and do the work”); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Grivas, 484 N.E.2d 429, 434 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (denying reformation of lease where lessee signed lease and court found no mistake
of fact, fraud, or misrepresentation despite the lessee’s contention that he did not read the terms of
the lease).
18. Hurd, supra note 1, at 124–25.
19. Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 L. & INEQ. 135, 150 (2009) (“People’s
preferences are highly contingent on situational factors, such as the framing of choices and the
channels by which choices are offered, and are thus readily subject to seller manipulation.”).
20. Grivas, 484 N.E.2d at 434 (denying reformation of lease where lessee signed lease and
court found no mistake of fact, fraud, or misrepresentation despite the lessee’s contention that he
did not read the terms of the lease); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1165 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding defendant accepted terms of license after purchasing and keeping the product after having
a chance to read the terms of the license).
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A. Observable Signs of an Internal Mental Status
How do courts determine whether someone has consented when there is a
dispute about it?21 That task is made easier because of the human ability to think
and communicate in using speech.22 A unique feature of human language is its
ability to transmit information about abstract concepts.23 Human beings can thus
communicate with each other through verbal as well as nonverbal means even
though no one can observe internal mental processes.
When human beings communicate through words, either oral or written, it is
referred to as verbal communication.24 Verbal communication allows humans
to express their internal mental processes with each other because human beings
have learned to associate meaning with oral or written words.25 For example,
we have learned to associate the word “yes” to denote the abstract concept of
consent or agreement.26 It is also commonly understood that someone agrees to
the terms of an agreement when the person signs on the signature line of a
document.27
Humans can also communicate their internal mental processes through nonverbal means. 28 Nonverbal communication is defined as “a process of
generating meaning using behavior other than words.” 29 Nonverbal
communication includes vocal elements, which is referred to as paralanguage
and includes pitch, volume, and rate.30 Nonverbal communications also include
non-vocal elements such as body language, gestures such as raising hands,
shaking another person’s hand, pushing a button, facial expressions, and eye

21. Courts have generally treated the existence of consent as a question of fact. Highland
Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Bank of Am., 698 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 2012) (“With respect to oral
contracts, whether a contracting party intends to be bound is a question of fact for the factfinder to
resolve.”); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Voluntariness of consent is
a question of fact determined by viewing the totality of relevant circumstances.”).
22. YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 21 (2015).
23. Id. at 24.
24. DAVID CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS: HOW BABIES BABBLE, WORDS CHANGE
MEANING, AND LANGUAGES LIVE OR DIE (2005).
25. COMMUNICATION IN THE REAL WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION
STUDIES 2 (Univ. of Minn. Librs. Publ’g 2d. ed. 2016) [hereinafter COMMUNICATION IN THE REAL
WORLD].
26. Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of
Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17, 19 (2010) (“We often speak of consent in binary terms,
boiling it down to ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ That reflects one of the most fundamental features of social life, a
phenomenon so widely observed as almost to escape mention: we generally smile on consensual
transactions but frown on unconsensual ones.”).
27. Orit Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615, 637 (“Consent
can be oral, such as a stated agreement, or behavioral, such as the click of a mouse or signature of
a document.”).
28. COMMUNICATION IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 25, at 164.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 165.
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contact, among others.31 For example, in most cultures, one can indicate consent
by nodding one’s head or by making certain hand gestures. At times, one can
also infer consent from another’s silence, action or inaction depending on the
circumstances.32
Verbal and nonverbal communications work as part of a larger language
system, but they have notable differences.33 First, verbal communication and
nonverbal communication are processed by different hemispheres of the brain.34
Next, nonverbal communication “conveys more emotional and affective
meaning” and “typically conveys more meaning than verbal communication.”35
Nonverbal communication is more involuntary and more ambiguous than verbal
communication.36 Finally, nonverbal communication can be more credible than
verbal communication.37
When there is a dispute about the existence of consent, courts have to rely on
evidence to resolve the dispute because of their inability to read the parties’
minds. Evidence of verbal and nonverbal communications, observable signs of
a person’s mental processes, thus allows courts to determine whether a party
consented.38
B. The Challenge to the Courts
Reliance on observable signs of consent raises multiple questions. One
problem is that the observable signs may not reflect the mental status
accurately.39 In other words, we may not say what we mean. Another problem
is that even when observable signs (such as signing a contract) accurately reflect
mental status, the mental status itself may be manipulated by some external
factor.40 In other words, we may say what we mean, but we may not know what
we are saying. 41 These possible discrepancies between observable signs of
consent and mental status have created the challenge with which courts have had
to wrestle.

31. Id.
32. See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) ( “[M]ost
of us would acknowledge that silence can at times be fraught with meaning. Indeed, there are a
surprising number of legal contexts where a person’s failure to act may be quite significant.”).
33. COMMUNICATION IN THE REAL WORLD, supra note 25, at 174.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Grivas, 484 N.E.2d at 434 (denying reformation of lease where lessee signed lease and
court found no mistake of fact, fraud, or misrepresentation despite the lessee’s contention that he
did not read the terms of the lease); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
39. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 8–10 (2011).
40. Id.; see also Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the
Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621 (2011); White, supra note 19 at 150.
41. White, supra note 19 at 149–50.
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Psychological and behavioral research over the last four decades has shed
more light on how human beings think.42 These studies show that humans suffer
from predictable cognitive biases which consistently lead to decisional errors.43
The predictability of our human biases also makes human beings easy target of
manipulation.44 This means that human will itself can be manipulated.45
Scientific findings show that determining when someone has consented is not
easy.46 If human will itself is manipulated, courts are faced with some difficult
questions. Should the court only concern itself with observable signs of
consent? Or should the law concern itself with honoring human will? The
challenge courts are facing is this discrepancy between observable signs of
consent and the internal state of human will free of outside influence.
C. Individual Autonomy and its Role in Judicial Consent Jurisprudence
The desire to honor a person’s consent is rooted in our belief in individual
autonomy and freedom.47 Consent understandably serves as justification for
imposing or avoiding legal liability or waiving certain rights.48 The question is
what type of consent actually optimizes and protects individual autonomy.
Legal scholars generally agree that, in order for consent to reflect individual
autonomy which the law is trying to promote, certain conditions have to be
met. 49 Autonomy-promoting consent exists where a person’s consent is
voluntary (voluntariness) and the person has access to necessary information,
and the ability to comprehend that information.50 Therefore, in order to truly

42. Kahneman, supra note 39.
43. Id. at 10; White, supra note 19 at 149–50.
44. Dan Ariely, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL, REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 321 (2009).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 7–8 (1986); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 384
(1985).
48. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing shrink wrap
license); Leonhard, Unbearable Lightness of Consent, supra note 2, at 59 (“Consent has morally
justified and legitimized government intervention in private contractual relationships.”); Strauss,
supra note 5, at 257 (“Consent is a personal waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, a personal
relinquishment of rights of privacy.”).
49. Scholars have formulated the conditions for a valid consent slightly differently. Professor
Nancy S. Kim described the different formulations of the conditions in her article. See Kim, supra
note 5, at 169–173 (describing the conditions promoting autonomy as intentionality, understanding,
and voluntariness and focusing her analyses on her own formulation of conditions as an intentional
act, knowledge, and voluntariness).
50. The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research, NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUM. SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
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honor individual autonomy, courts should only hold the consenting party
accountable where their consent is a result of voluntariness, information, and
comprehension. 51 Scholars have labeled this type of consent as “informed
consent.”52
Observable signs of consent may evidence voluntariness by means of an act
either through verbal or nonverbal communication. They are, however, no proof
that the voluntary act means consent based on access to information and
comprehension. For ease of reference, this article uses the term, simple consent,
to denote consent based merely on observable signs of consent whether verbal
or non-verbal but without evaluation of the information or comprehension
elements, 53 to differentiate it from the informed consent approach which
considers all three elements.
II. CONSENT IN CONTRACT, MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND CRIMINAL
CONFESSION CASES
A review of selected cases shows that the judicial consent approaches across
the three areas started from a similar position in the late nineteenth century.
Courts’ search for consent focused on observable signs of consent and
recognized the importance of voluntariness through defenses such as duress,
undue influence, or coercion.54 In other words, all courts began with the simple
consent approach.
In contract disputes, courts’ consent approach has stayed constant throughout
the examined period and retains the simple consent approach to this day. In
medical treatment cases however, courts have over time evolved from the simple
consent approach to a search for informed consent. In criminal confession cases,
the courts’ approach to consent also changed dramatically over time with the
adoption of a presumption of non-consent in custodial interrogations.
A. Consent in Contract Law
Consent plays a prominent role in contract law because consent of the parties
remains the justification for courts to exercise state power to enforce private

BEHAV. RSCH. (1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_
FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2021) [hereinafter Belmont Report].
51. Kim, supra note 5, at 169–70.
52. Belmont Report, supra note 50; Kim, supra note 5, at 171.
53. This term was used by Dr. Simon N. Whitney et al., in their article, A Typology of Shared
Decision Making, Informed Consent, and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 54, 55
(2004) (where simple consent occurs by verbal or non-verbal communication such as “accepting
and filling a prescription or by choosing fish instead of steak when advised to eat a more hearthealthy diet.”).
54. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S.
613, 623 (1896); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
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agreements.55 If a party has consented to the terms of the agreement, then the
consent creates obligation on the part of the consenter.56 The search for evidence
of consent is thus the courts’ primary focus when parties dispute that they have
consented.
In their search for consent in contract disputes, courts have focused on
observable signs of consent, both verbal and nonverbal, since the late nineteenth
century. Courts have referred to these observable signs as “manifestations of
assent.” 57 Courts’ approach remains the same today despite the tremendous
technological changes in business practices our society has experienced over the
last few decades with the ascent of the internet and e-commerce. 58
1. Verbal Signs of Consent
Courts have generally accepted a party’s signature (verbal communication) as
evidence of consent absent situations which would trigger contract law defenses
since the late 19th century.59 One’s signature is an observable sign of consent.60
Indeed, courts treat written contracts as the highest evidence of the terms of an
agreement and impose a duty on every contracting party to learn and know its
contents before signing.61 Courts even enforce a contract against a party where
the party signed the agreement even if they did not read it.62

55. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 493
(1993).
56. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26
YALE L.J. 169, 171 (1917).
57. Tole, 6 Cow. at 339; Knutson, 771 F.3d at 561, 565 (discussing whether failure to cancel
a trial subscription constituted a manifestation of assent to an arbitration provision).
58. Kar & Radin, supra note 5, at 1140–42 (describing the changes that technology has
brought about to our society while contract law has remained the same resulting in lack of
coherence between the meaning and function of the core contract law concepts such as consent).
59. Coolidge v. Puaaiki, 3 Haw. 810, 814 (1877); Grivas, 484 N.E.2d at 434 (denying
reformation of lease where lessee signed lease and court found no mistake of fact, fraud, or
misrepresentation despite the lessee’s contention that he did not read the terms of the lease).
60. Coolidge, 3 Haw. at 813 (“The laborers signed the contract intelligently and there is no
allegation made that either of the parties here have been sent to any place or subjected to any
exposure which was not reasonably contemplated by themselves when they signed the contract.”).
61. Vargas v. Esquire. Inc., 166 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1948) (“It is a rule universally
recognized that a written contract is the highest evidence of the terms of an agreement, and it is the
duty of every contracting party to learn and know its contents before he signs it.”).
62. Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 927 N.E.2d 137, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010);
Montgomery v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 713 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is
well established that failure to read an agreement is not a valid defense to enforcement of a
contract.”); Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993) (rejecting appellee’s argument that
release was invalid because he did not read it) (“It is well settled that failure to read a contract
before signing it will not invalidate the contract.”); Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire &
Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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Courts have also found consent where consent was communicated orally,
another observable sign of consent. Courts have often enforced an oral contract
unless writing is specifically required by statutes of fraud. 63
With the advent of e-commerce in recent decades, courts have found consent
based on the digital versions of verbal communication of consent—clicking “I
accept” or “I agree,” also known as clickwrap agreements.64 Many businesses
have established an online presence and use standard form agreements with
boilerplate clauses. Website users are sometimes required to click an “I agree”
box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use or with a link
to those terms.65
For example, in Holl v. United Parcel Service, the District Court for the
Northern District of California enforced an arbitration clause against the plaintiff
where the plaintiff checked a box when signing up for the defendant’s
program.66 The text next to the box read, “[b]y selecting this checkbox and the
Continue button, I agree to the UPS Technology Agreement and the UPS My
Choice® Service Terms.” 67 The actual terms were hyperlinked next to the
checkbox. The court found that the plaintiff was provided with an opportunity
to review the terms of service and was put on “inquiry notice” of the terms.68
The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the plaintiff did not meaningfully
consent to the terms.69 Apparently, the plaintiff’s act of clicking the box is
sufficient as evidence of consent.
2. Nonverbal Signs of Consent
U.S. courts have also found consent to contract terms based on nonverbal
signs. For example, courts have found that the consent is satisfied where one
party noticed the contract terms and did not return the product.70 In these cases,

63. Heritage Roofing, LLC, 164 S.W.3d at 135 (holding that party orally accepted terms of
written proposal when he stated “I approve it, I want you to go ahead and do the work.”); Tymon
v. Linoki, 213 N.E.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. 1965) (holding enforceable contract of sale was made when
plaintiff orally accepted written offer).
64. I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.Supp.2d 328, 338 (D. Mass 2002);
Ranazzi v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 N.E.3d 213, 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Collins P. Marks, There
Oughta Be a Law: What Corporate Social Responsibility Can Teach Us About Consumer Contract
Formation, 32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 498, 499 (2020).
65. Marks, supra note 64, at 499.
66. Holl v. United Parcel Service, No. 16-cv-05856, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153317, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2017).
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id. at *14.
69. Id. at *12–13.
70. Lewis v. Meginniss, 12 So.19, 21 (Fla. 1892) (describing the “well-recognized principle
of law that, where one person performs services for another at his request, or where services are
rendered by one person for another without his expressed request, but with his knowledge and under
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courts assume the nonverbal act⎯noticing the product and failing to return the
product, constitutes evidence of consent.
In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, the United States Supreme Court enforced
a forum selection clause included among three pages of terms attached to a
boarding ticket for a cruise ship vacation.71 The Supreme Court enforced the
forum selection clause because the buyers had notice of the terms and considered
the plaintiff’s conduct of going on the cruise, a non-verbal communication, as
evidence of consent.72
Following the Carnival Cruise Lines case, courts began enforcing agreements
against a consenting party where the party communicated consent non-verbally,
for example, by keeping a product.73 In those cases, buyers typically purchased
a product without seeing the contract terms.74 Courts enforced the contract term
against the buyer because the buyer kept the products after they had notice of
the terms.75 The act of keeping the product is treated as evidence of consent.
For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., plaintiff buyers who had
purchased computers through a telephone order sued the manufacturer under the
Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act among others.76 The
manufacturer tried to enforce the arbitration clause included in terms sent to
buyers together with the computers.77 The lower court refused to enforce the
agreement and the manufacturer appealed.78 Judge Easterbrook found that the
terms sent in box, which stated that they governed sale unless computer was
returned within 30 days, were binding on the plaintiffs.79 Judge Easterbrook
apparently treated the act of keeping the computers as non-verbal
communication of consent.80
In some cases, courts found apparent consent where business websites state
that website visitors agree to the terms by browsing the site’s content as long as

circumstances which give rise to the presumption of a promise to pay for them, reasonable
compensation may be recovered”); Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1060 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
71. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587, 595 (1991).
72. Id. at 593–97.
73. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452–53; Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064, 1999 Del.
Super. LEXIS 563 at *1, 19 (Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999).
74. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1148.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1148–49.
80. Id. at 1149; see also ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
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there was some evidence that the consenting party was aware of the terms.81 In
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., plaintiff Pollstar allowed internet users, subject to a
license agreement, to download concert information published on Pollstar’s
website.82 Pollstar alleged defendant Gigmania breached the license agreement
by copying information from Pollstar’s website and using it on Gigmania’s
website for commercial purposes.83 On a defense motion to dismiss, Gigmania
argued that there was a lack of mutual consent to the license agreement because
the web page containing the agreement was only linked to the homepage, and
while the homepage contained a notice stating “use is subject to license
agreement,” it appeared in gray print with a gray background. 84 While
acknowledging that website users might be unaware of the agreement, the court
refused to declare the invalidity and unenforceability of the license agreement.85
The court noted that it was possible for people to “enter into a contract by using
a service without first seeing the terms.”86
In conclusion, in adjudicating contract disputes, courts seem to be satisfied
that consent exists where a person acted voluntarily, for example, by signing or
clicking a button or keeping a product without any objections. Courts’ search
for consent does not go beyond observable signs of consent.87
B. Consent in Medical Treatment Cases88
In medical treatment cases, consent becomes an issue when a defendant raises
it as a defense against a plaintiff’s attempt to seek recovery for injury caused by
a treatment. The consent issue can arise in multiple scenarios. One scenario is
that the defendant did not obtain any consent at all. 89 Another is that the
defendant obtained consent for one treatment but provided a different

81. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004) (enforcing a
browsewrap agreement based on defendant’s admission that he was aware of the terms); Specht v.
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce a browsewrap
contract because of lack of mutual assent).
82. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
83. Id. at 976–77.
84. Id. at 980–81.
85. Id. at 981–82.
86. Id. at 982.
87. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452–
53.
88. To keep this article’s examination more manageable, this article focuses only on judicial
approaches to consent in medical treatment cases. Consent is a shield against imposition of liability
in many different types of tort claims. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1979) (“[N]o one suffers a legal wrong as the result of an act to which, unaffected by
fraud, mistake or duress, he freely consents or to which he manifests apparent consent.”).
89. Shulman v. Lerner, 141 N.W.2d 348, 348–49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).
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treatment.90 The third scenario is where the defendant obtained consent for and
provided the treatment, but the plaintiffs argue that they would not have given
consent had the doctor advised them of all the risks.91 In all three situations,
courts have to determine if the plaintiffs in fact consented to the treatment.
Courts in the late nineteenth century treated the act of seeking a physician’s
treatment as a form of non-verbal consent.92 Eventually, courts rejected the
implicit consent approach and began to focus on the quality of consent.93 Today,
all states have adopted the informed consent standard in medical treatment
cases.94
1. Voluntary Act of Seeking Medical Treatment as Consent
Courts began wrestling with the consent issue involving medical treatments
in the late nineteenth century.95 When a plaintiff raised lack of consent as the
basis for recovery, courts treated the plaintiff patient’s seeking medical
treatment as “consent” for a doctor to perform an operation and the only basis
for recovery in that situation would be under a negligence theory.96
For example, in the 1898 Sullivan v. McGraw case, the plaintiff sued a doctor
to recover damages for the wrongful operation upon the plaintiff’s left leg when
the defendant was employed to operate upon the right leg.97 The plaintiff alleged
that the “defendant wrongfully and carelessly operated upon the left leg, thereby
causing plaintiff great pain and suffering.”98 The plaintiff argued that he did not
consent to the operation on the left leg.99 The lower court rejected the consent
argument and treated the case as resting on a negligence theory.100 The lower
court noted that the plaintiff had gone to the doctor for the purpose of having an
operation, suggesting that the plaintiff’s visit at the doctor was deemed as
consent implied from the plaintiff’s conduct.101 The lower court then directed a
verdict for the defendant because of lack of evidence of any negligence. On
appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s statement on the

90. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905); In re Estate of Johnson, 16 N.W.2d
504, 507 (Neb. 1944).
91. Rodriguez v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 858 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008).
92. Sullivan v. McGraw, 76 N.W. 149, 150–51 (Mich. 1898).
93. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
94. Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 172 (1994).
95. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 47, at 7–8.
96. Sullivan, 76 N.W. at 150–51.
97. Id. at 149.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 150.
100. Id. at 150–51.
101. Id.
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consent issue.102 The courts accepted the plaintiff’s voluntary act of seeking
medical treatment as evidence of consent.
2. Requirement of Verbal Communication of Consent
A few years later, an Illinois court rejected the idea of a broad implicit consent
simply by seeking treatment.103 In Pratt v. Davis, Mrs. Pratt sued a physician
for battery because he performed a hysterectomy on her without first obtaining
her consent. The plaintiff did not allege the operation was unskillfully
performed.104 The physician had obtained her consent for an earlier operation,
but admitted he had not even attempted to get consent for the second
procedure. 105 The physician acknowledged he had intentionally misled the
plaintiff and had taken chances of which she had been completely unaware.106
The doctor claimed that because Mrs. Pratt was an epileptic, she was
incompetent to give consent or to deliberate intelligently about her situation.107
The court held the physician liable for operating without consent.108 The Illinois
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the appellate court’s reasoning.109
While acknowledging the broad rule regarding the implied consent, the
appellate court rejected the defense argument that the plaintiff’s voluntary act of
seeking treatment gave the consent for him to do whatever he might have
deemed necessary. 110 The court limited the implied consent to specific
procedures and not to seeking medical treatment in general.111 The court held
that the surgeon had to obtain express consent from the patient before the
surgeon could engage in a serious, major operation.112
Eight years later, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma extended the reasoning in
the Pratt case to narrowly interpret the scope of a patient’s consent.113 In Rolater
v. Strain, a woman sued her physician after he removed a sesamoid bone from
her foot during an operation.114 The plaintiff had consented to the operation to
drain an infection, but had instructed the doctor not to remove any bones from

102. Id. at 151.
103. Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1905), aff’d, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
104. Id. at 180.
105. Id. at 170.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 183–84.
109. Pratt, 79 N.E. at 565.
110. Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 166.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 166–67; see also Mohr, 104 N.W. at 14−15 (adopting the reasoning of the Pratt
court and holding that the surgeon should have consulted with the patient and obtained her consent
before performing any surgery).
113. Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 98 (Okla. 1913).
114. Id. at 96.
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her foot.115 The defendant argued that Mohr v. Williams did not apply because
he obtained the patient’s consent to operate on the foot and he operated on the
correct foot.116 The court rejected the argument and held that the principles of
the earlier cases applied to the facts.117 The court noted that the doctor did not
operate on the foot in the exact manner that the patient had consented to.118
With those cases, courts moved away from the earlier implicit consent rule
based on nonverbal communication⎯the seeking of medical treatment. Courts
required doctors to obtain the patient’s explicit consent before they could operate
on a patient, except for certain life-threatening emergencies.119
3. The Informed Consent Doctrine in Medical Treatment Cases
Courts in early twentieth century cases discussed the consent issue related to
lack of consent and scope of consent, i.e., whether a doctor needed to obtain
consent at all and the scope of the consent. They did not focus on the quality of
the consent until a few decades later.120
In 1957, a California court first addressed quality of consent in Salgo v. Leland
Standford Jr. University Board of Trustees.121 Mr. Salgo brought a malpractice
suit against his physicians alleging negligence when he became permanently
paralyzed after having undergone an aortography.122 Mr. Salgo’s doctor had
recommended the surgery and the patient consented to the procedure.123 Mr.
Salgo argued that the doctor never explained the various possible complications
of the suggested procedures or warned him about the risk of potential
paralysis.124 The court stated that “[a] physician violates his duty to his patient
and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment.” 125 The court specified that the information needed to make an
intelligent decision included the harms, benefits, risks and alternatives of the
proposed procedure.126 The court left it to the doctor’s discretion to decide how
much information to disclose to the patient.127 The Salgo court thus imposed a

115. Id. at 97.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (relying on Pratt and
Mohr for support).
120. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 172–75.
123. Id. at 173.
124. Id. at 181.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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duty on the doctor to disclose the facts necessary to form the basis of an
“intelligent consent.” 128
Subsequent to Salgo, the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized the duty to
disclose rule in a negligence claim.129 In Natanson v. Kline, the plaintiff suffered
from breast cancer and had a mastectomy.130 She then endured cobalt therapy
to the mastectomy site to reduce the chance that the cancer would spread.131
After she was injured from the cobalt radiation therapy, she sued her radiologist
for negligence both in the performance of the procedure and in failing to warn
her about the nature and hazards of the treatment.132 The court outlined the duty
of disclosure as “the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain to the
patient in language as simple as necessary, the nature of the ailment, the nature
of the proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and
perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the
body.”133
By imposing a duty to disclose on the defendant, courts refuse to accept verbal
and nonverbal communication of consent alone as evidence of consent. 134
Instead, plaintiffs have to give consent while having access to the necessary
information and comprehension, i.e., plaintiffs’ consent has to be informed.
The informed consent doctrine has now been firmly established in medical
treatment cases. 135 All U.S. jurisdictions have adopted it. 136 States began
codifying the informed consent doctrine between 1957 and 1988.137 All states
have now enacted statutes mandating informed consent before a physician can
provide any medical treatment.138

128. Id.
129. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
130. Id. at 1095.
131. Id. at 1096.
132. Id. at 1098–99.
133. Id. at 1106. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the exact contours of the duty
to disclose. The scope of the duty to disclose and the precise standard to measure if the duty to
disclose has been complied with is a subject of intense scholarly discussion. See generally David
M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure
of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103 (2007); Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed
Consent: No Longer Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 15 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 17 (2010).
134. Jay Katz, Informed Consent⎯Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 69, 72 (1993) (noting that “the doctrine of informed consent, if taken seriously, constitutes
a revolutionary break with customary practice”).
135. Szczygiel, supra note 94, at 172.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 189–90.
138. For interesting discussions about the codification efforts, see Kandy G. Webb, Recent
Medical Malpractice Legislation—A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 631, 675 (1976).
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C. Consent in Criminal Cases Involving Admissibility of Confessions
Consent also features prominently in criminal cases as the basis to determine
when defendants’ own words can be used against them. 139 The U.S.
Constitution prohibits the government from compelling individuals in a criminal
case to be witnesses against themselves.140 Defendants may waive the right
based on consent. 141 The observable sign of consent in this context is a
defendant’s making of oral statements or signing a written statement.142 Consent
justifies the use of defendants’ incriminating statements against them despite the
constitutional prohibition.143
The late 19th century saw courts treating the act of making a confession as
consent unless the circumstances suggested the act was not voluntary.144 The
U.S. Supreme Court then elevated the consent issue as a matter of constitutional
due process and eventually adopted the totality of the circumstances standard to
ascertain the existence of consent. 145 The Court focused its inquiry on the
accused’s access to information, whether the information was comprehended,
and whether the act of consenting was voluntary.146 The courts use this totality
of the circumstances standard essentially to ascertain if the defendant’s waiver
was based on informed consent.147
However, the Court did not stop with the totality of the circumstances
standard. In 1966, with Miranda v. Arizona, the Court took a dramatic turn and
rejected a finding of consent based on verbal and non-verbal communication in
the making or signing of a confession when the accused was in a custodial
interrogation.148 The Court essentially adopted a presumption of non-consent in
a custodial interrogation unless the necessary information has been provided.149

139. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541–42
(1897); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
141. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966); United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1997) (finding confessions voluntary after defendant alleged they were involuntary due to
his “mental disease” and the conduct of Secret Service agents who interviewed him).
142. Santos, 131 F.3d at 19.
143. Some scholars may question whether the confession cases are really decided on the basis
of free will or choice. Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We
Needed It, How We Got It—and What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 164–65 (2007).
That debate is beyond the scope of this article. It is also beyond the scope of this article to examine
whether consent should justify a finding of waiver of a constitutional right.
144. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
145. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514.
146. Id. at 513–14.
147. Id.
148. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58, 467–68.
149. Id. at 467–69, 475–76.
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1. The Common Law Presumption of Consent
In assessing whether the accused confessed voluntarily, the late nineteenth
century courts focused on observable signs of consent—the making or the
signing of the confession by itself—as evidence of consent unless the
circumstances showed that the accused did not do so voluntarily.150 The courts
presumed that an innocent person would not imperil their safety or prejudice
their interests by an untrue statement. 151 Based on that presumption, courts
found a confession voluntary in the absence of inducements, promises, and
threats.152
For example, courts found confessions voluntary if the defendant made the
statements voluntarily and the statements were not obtained by putting the
prisoner in fear or by promises.153 The fact that the defendant was in custody
and in irons did not destroy the competency of a confession.154 Imprisonment
was not, in itself, sufficient to justify the exclusion of a confession.155
In Hopt v. Utah, the Court found that the defendant consented when he made
the confession voluntarily without requiring additional evidence of noncoercion. 156 The witness, a detective, arrested the defendant at a railroad
depot.157 The detective then sent the defendant to jail with a policeman while
he remained behind.158 A few minutes later, the detective rejoined the defendant
and the policeman.159 The accused confessed to the detective at that time.160
During the trial, the detective testified that the defendant made the confession
voluntarily, “uninfluenced by hopes of reward or fear of punishment.”161 On
appeal, the defendant argued that the court should have excluded the confession

150. Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 309, 320, 328–29 (1998) (“Given the myriad ways in which early modern Anglo-American
criminal procedure compelled incriminating testimony from the accused, it is not surprising that
confessions were considered admissible no matter how they were obtained.”).
151. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
152. Id.; Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355, 357 (1896).
153. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 622 (1896) (“But
the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence, namely, that one who is innocent
will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the
confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature,
held out by one in authority touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise, by or
in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused in reference
to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession
voluntary within the meaning of the law.”).
154. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 55.
155. Id.; see also Wilson, 162 U. S. at 623.
156. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
157. Id. at 584.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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and required that the prosecution prove that the policeman did not do anything
with the defendant outside of the detective’s presence to unduly influence the
confession.162 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument.163
2. The Adoption of the Totality of the Circumstances Standard
Over the next three decades, judicial decisions show that the courts became
more aware of the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements
on the mind and will of an accused. 164 The consent question took on
constitutional dimension in 1936 when the Court held that admission of a
coerced confession would deny the accused due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 165 The Court found that coerced confessions and resulting
convictions would be “revolting to the sense of justice” and “a clear denial of
due process.”166
In 1963, the Court adopted the totality of the circumstances standard in
Haynes v. Washington to determine whether a defendant’s confession was
voluntary. 167 Under that test, courts would examine almost every factor
involved in the case. For example, courts would consider the intelligence,
physical health, and emotional characteristics of the particular suspect, their age,
education and prior criminal record, how often they were fed, whether they were
deprived of sleep, how long the police questioning lasted, whether relatives or
friends had been turned away, and whether their request for a lawyer had been
denied. 168 Even though the Court did not frame the issue in those terms, it
focused its analyses on the presence or lack of voluntariness and access to
information and comprehension, all elements of an informed consent.169
In Haynes, the defendant argued his confession was involuntary and
inadmissible, because it was induced by police threats and promises.170 The
defendant “testified at trial that during the approximately 16-hour period
between the time of his arrest and the making and signing of the written

162. Id. at 585.
163. Id. at 587.
164. See Penney, supra note 150, at 329.
165. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). Gerard E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda
for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 236 n.4 (2007) (“The era of the Court’s involvement
with these issues is conventionally understood to have begun with the Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936).”).
166. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
167. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514.
168. Dassey v. Dittman, 877 F.3d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Whether [petitioner’s] confession
was voluntary or not is measured against a general standard that takes into account the totality of
the circumstances.”); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“This totality-of-thecircumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where
interrogation of juveniles is involved.”); Kamisar, supra note 143, at 164–65.
169. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513–15.
170. Id. at 504.
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confession,” he asked police to allow him to call an attorney and to call his wife
several times.171 The police refused his requests and repeatedly told him “he
would not be allowed to call unless and until he ‘cooperated’ with police and
gave them a written and signed confession admitting participation in the
robbery.”172
The police denied him contact with the outside even after he signed a
confession and after a preliminary hearing.173 The police held the petitioner
incommunicado for about a week after his arrest.174 The defendant did not claim
that the police physically abused him, denied him food or sleep, or questioned
him for extended periods of time.175
The Haynes Court emphasized that the question whether the police obtained
the petitioner’s confession “by coercion or improper inducement” (that is
whether the confession was voluntary) depended on an examination of the
surrounding circumstances.176 The Court, in a five-to-four decision, held the
confession inadmissible. 177 With the totality of the circumstances standard,
courts focused on the quality of consent rather than merely considering
observable signs of consent, such as the acts of making or signing a
confession.178
3. Miranda’s Presumption of Non-Consent in a Custodial Interrogation
Three years after the Haynes decision, the Court’s consent approach took a
dramatic turn with Miranda v. Arizona.179 The Court found that the statement
obtained from an accused without providing the accused with the necessary

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 504 n.1.
176. Id. at 513.
177. Id. at 514.
178. Id. (“Confronted with the express threat of continued incommunicado detention and
induced by the promise of communication with and access to family, Haynes understandably chose
to make and sign the damning written statement; given the unfair and inherently coercive context
in which made, that choice cannot be said to be the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained
will, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda decision has generated extensive
scholarly discussions from all different perspectives. See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1060 (1998) (concluding “that Miranda has in fact
handcuffed the cops and that society should begin to explore other, less costly ways of regulating
police interrogation”); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1, 21 (1986) (“Thus, Miranda’s symbolic value not only has produced a better
atmosphere for people who come in contact with the police but also may have made a tangible
contribution toward curbing abusive police practices.”). This article focuses only on the Miranda
case for its significance on the consent issue.
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warnings was not admissible as part of the government’s case in chief.180 While
the totality of circumstances test remains the standard in non-custodial cases,181
the Miranda approach is a drastic departure from the prior consent approach,
because it disregards all observable signs of consent when a defendant is in
police custody where the police failed to provide the Miranda warning.182 In
other words, the accused’s observable sign of consent⎯the making or signing
of a confession⎯was presumed to be invalid where the police failed to warn the
accused of the consequences of their statements.183
In Miranda, police obtained statements from several defendants questioned
while in custody or while their freedom was restrained in significant ways.184
All of the defendants were interrogated in isolation. 185 No defendant was
warned of their rights before their interrogations.186 The police obtained oral
admissions and statements signed by three of the defendants throughout those
interrogations. 187
Noting those statements were obtained during
incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere without full
warnings of constitutional rights, the Court found the statements inadmissible
because they were not given voluntarily.188
The Court recognized that the inherent coercive pressures of custodial
interrogations would force defendants to speak where they would not otherwise
do so freely.189 To resist these pressures and to safeguard the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Court announced suspects had to be “adequately and
effectively apprised of [their] rights” prior to the questioning.190
The Court held that for a confession to be considered voluntary, a suspect in
custodial interrogation must be warned “[p]rior to any questioning, . . . that he

180. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
181. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285−86 (1991).
182. One could argue that this is no different from the contract law defense of duress where a
party’s consent would be invalid if the consent was given under duress. Duress under contract law
is a defense where the party seeking to invalidate consent has the burden of proof. In the Miranda
context, there is a presumption of non-consent in favor of the party seeking to invalidate consent.
This is also different from the situations where law disregards consent altogether for example, in
contract law, consent by a minor is presumed to be invalid, in criminal law, consent is not a defense
against a rape where the victim is a minor. In those situations, the law presumes that the parties are
not capable of consenting. In the Miranda context, the defendant is capable of consent, but the
Miranda rule presumes that consent is invalid unless the defendant is given the necessary
information in the form of the required warnings.
183. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
184. Id. at 445.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 467.
190. Id.
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has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.”191 The Miranda warnings mandated by the Court are
designed to provide the defendant with the necessary information to provide an
informed consent.192
III. SAME QUESTION, BUT DIFFERENT APPROACHES—POSSIBLE
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIVERGENCE
Courts are faced with the same factual question in all three contexts: has the
consenting party actually consented? Why have courts developed different
approaches, retaining the simple consent approach in contract disputes while
adopting heightened standards for consent in medical treatment and criminal
confession cases? This section offers some possible explanations for this
divergence.
Multiple factors contribute to the divergent approaches. Consent plays a
different role in contract disputes from that in medical treatment and criminal
confession cases. Courts adopted the heightened consent inquiry in medical
treatment and criminal confession cases in response to significant social changes
and increased public awareness of individual rights and the need to protect
individuals from potential abuses and arbitrary government power. In the
economic area, although business practices have changed dramatically, courts
have retained the simple consent approach based apparently on business
justifications.
A. Different Contexts, Different Interests, and Different Approaches
The divergent approaches can be explained by the different contexts in which
the consent issue is raised. Consent in contract law is intimately associated with
important aspects of our very identity including individual autonomy and
freedom of contract. Contracts deal with economic relationships. Interests
being protected in medical and criminal cases are different. In medical treatment
cases, courts are trying to protect the right to bodily integrity. In criminal cases,
courts are trying to protect a person’s right to life, liberty, and against arbitrary
government power.

191. Id. at 444.
192. For a discussion of courts’ treatment of confession where the accused gave confessions
after the Miranda warning, please see Garrett, supra note 6, at 1092 (examining false confessions
in forty cases).
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1. Consent’s Role in Contractual Relationships
Consent is the sine qua non of contract. 193 Because of a commitment to
individual autonomy and freedom of contract, courts have always focused on
enforcing parties’ intent and refrained from interfering in parties’ contractual
relationships.194 In addition, contract law is conventionally viewed as protecting
private parties’ economic relationships. 195 Consent is the basis to impose
obligations on both parties to the contract. The simple consent approach favors
the finding of a contract while a heightened consent approach would have led to
a finding of no contract.196
The simple consent approach in contract law has been justified based on
economic liberties and freedom of contract.197 With the prevalence of form
contracts and e-commerce, courts began relying on economic justifications to
enforce contracts based on observable signs of consent.198 The Supreme Court
enforced a forum selection clause based on the business’ need to limit the fora
in which it could be sued, the potential to save litigants time and conserve
judicial resources, and the reduced cost for cruise passengers.199 Other courts
also relied on market place justifications to enforce contract terms based on
verbal or non-verbal signs of consent. Because it would be practically difficult
to convey all the contract terms at the time of a sale, accepting the consenting
party’s verbal or non-verbal signs as evidence of consent would help reduce
transaction costs,200 saving both contractual parties money.201

193. Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent:
A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1293 (1989).
194. West, supra note 47, at 384.
195. Contracts have also been used to deprive people of their access to courts and right to a
jury trial through arbitration agreements. See Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions,
supra note 9, at 421–22. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all the rights affected by
the judicial consent approach when adjudicating contract dispute.
196. Id. at 407–08, 416.
197. Leonhard, Unbearable Lightness of Consent, supra note 2, at 57.
198. Shute, 499 U.S. at 593–94 (1991).
199. Id.
200. Deborah Zalesne, Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The Boundary Between
Private Contract and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 584 (2005) (noting that
“[c]ourts have typically been enthusiastic about upholding private exchanges to protect commerce,
the business community, and the efficiency of the marketplace”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983); Hill, 105 F.3d at
1149 (“Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions. Customers as a group
are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use
instead a simple approve-or-return device.”).
201. Zalesne, supra note 200, at 586 (“Adhesion contracts are beneficial to both businesses
and consumers. Standardization of terms ‘reduces transaction costs . . . and stabilize[s] the
incidents of doing business,’ thereby saving both the buyer and seller money.”).
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2. Role of Consent in Protecting the Rights to Self-Determination and
Bodily Integrity
Consent plays a different role in medical treatment cases. In these cases,
doctors are using consent to avoid liability to the consenting patients.202 The
interests at stake are the patients’ right to bodily integrity and self-determination.
A heightened standard of consent protects individual rights while a simple
consent approach, which would lead to a finding of consent, would have resulted
in undermining those rights.
The desire to protect individual rights motivated the courts to move away from
the simple consent approach to the informed consent approach. In rejecting the
voluntary act of seeking medical treatment as consent, the Pratt court described
what it called “the right to the inviolability of his person” as having “universal
acquiescence.”203 The court explained that universal right meant that doctors
were prohibited from violating the bodily integrity of patients without
permission.
Other courts echoed the same sentiment by focusing on the patient’s right to
self-determination. Justice Cardozo famously stated: “[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent, commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.”204
3. Role of Consent in Protection of Liberty and Against Arbitrary
Government Power
Consent in criminal confession cases serves as a shield to protect the accused
against invasion of the accused’s liberty interests and arbitrary government
power. A heightened consent inquiry affords the accused more protection than
a simple consent approach.
In criminal confession cases, courts recognized the right not to be compelled
to testify against oneself as “resting on the law of nature.”205 The Court pointed
out that the importance of the right not to testify against oneself was reflected in
the fact that the right was embodied in the Constitution.206
Distrust of arbitrary government power is part of our national identity. The
Bill of Rights is designed to curb excessive government power.207 The Miranda

202. See, e.g., Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
203. Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 166.
204. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
205. Bram, 168 U.S. at 545.
206. Id. at 544–45 (relying on Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896)) (acknowledging
the maximum “Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare” being “clothed in this country with the
impregnability of a constitutional enactment.”).
207. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459 (“Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights
were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty.”).
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decision reflects courts’ concerns about exercise of arbitrary government power
which could violate fundamental principles of liberty and justice.208 The Court
did not want a trial to be a mere pretense where the state obtained a conviction
solely based on coerced confessions.209 The Court believed that respect for the
inviolability of the human person demanded that the state had the burden to
produce evidence against an individual through its own work, rather than by
compelled confessions.210
Courts were also aware of the temptation for police to exert undue pressure
on witnesses. 211 Confessions have always ranked high on the scale of
incriminating evidence.212 The Court believed that condoning the use of coerced
confessions would undermine the legitimacy of our system of law and justice.213
At the same time, the Court was also concerned about the difficulty of judicial
search for informed consent under the totality of the circumstances standard,
noting that “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with
authorities, can never be more than speculation.”214
B. Judicial Preference of Protection of Liberty Interests Over That of
Economic Interests215
Courts have traditionally erected additional safeguards to protect people’s
liberty interests against arbitrary government power. Courts have treated
economic and property interests as second-class rights less deserving of
protection.216 The judicial attitude may reflect the belief that property interest,
if damaged, can be compensated for by some other form of property interest

208. Id. at 459–60.
209. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
210. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235–38 (1940).
211. Brown, 161 U.S. at 595–97.
212. Id.
213. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 519.
214. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69.
215. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine why courts have maintained such a
distinction or whether courts should maintain such a distinction. For an interesting discussion about
the Supreme Court’s economic rights jurisprudence, see Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s
Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329 (1995).
216. CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 154 (2007);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We do not sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
or social conditions.”); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (noting that liberty rights are
preferred over property rights when courts balance them against each other); Erin Rahne Kidwell,
The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62
ALB. L. REV. 91, 124 (1998).
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while liberty interests affect everyone⎯“diminish one and all are
diminished.”217
This judicial bias in favor of liberty interests is reflected in multiple judicial
approaches. For example, the Supreme Court employs a heightened standard to
scrutinize government restrictions on liberty interests, but a deferential lower
rational basis scrutiny regarding government regulations on economic
interests.218 The different burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases show that
courts favor protection of people’s liberty interests over their economic
interests.219 In civil cases, a plaintiff generally only has to prove a claim by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to recover against a defendant.220 In
criminal cases, the government has to prove an accused is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.221
Medical treatment and criminal confession cases implicate liberty interests
deemed important by courts. The desire to protect those liberty interests may
explain why the courts’ consent approach evolved from simple consent to
heightened consent scrutiny in those cases. Contract disputes, on the other hand,
involve primarily economic interests. Here courts are apparently content with
the simple consent approach.

217. Kidwell, supra note 216, at 124.
218. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (noting that the state may
promulgate any regulation justified by a rational basis under the due process clause as opposed to
a more limited power when more fundamental restrictions such as those associated with speech and
press are involved).
219. Andrew E. Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint? The Meaning and Social Value
of the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental Access to ThirdParty Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839, 854–56 (2013).
[T]he level of the standard of proof expresses important societal values. If the
individual or group interest invaded is considered of moderate social importance or the
degree of invasion of that interest is likewise seen as moderate, then the lower
preponderance standard of proof suffices. But if the interest invaded is seen as highly
important or its degree of invasion as extreme, the higher beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is required. . . . [B]ecause we value some things more than others, our
tolerance for error in finding the facts and in applying the law varies. The
preponderance standard tolerates a fairly significant risk of error; the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard permits much less of a risk. Id.
220. McCormick on Evidence § 339 (John William Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
221. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The ‘demand for a
higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times, [though] its crystallization into the formula ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ seems
to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as
the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the
essential elements of guilt. Id.
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C. Significant Social Events Coincided with the Heightened Consent Inquiry
Courts do not operate in a vacuum. What happens in society affects judicial
decision making.222 American society underwent tremendous change during
early and mid-twentieth century. Those changes contributed to the development
of judicial consent jurisprudence in medical treatment and criminal confession
cases.
The Enlightenment philosophies have had a dramatic effect on American
society since the founding of the country.223 The leading American thinkers
adopted the Enlightenment ideas of freedom, democracy, and reason as the
primary values of society. 224 Common people were becoming increasingly
aware of their individual rights.225
After the Second World War, reports about Nazi doctors’ medical
experiments on prisoners shocked the public’s conscience. 226 In the 1960s,
scholars began raising concerns about medical experiments without the subjects’
consent.227 Although these notorious abuses did not occur in medical treatment
settings, their publicity increased the public and judicial awareness of the
importance of the right to bodily integrity and the potential for abuse. 228
Courts’ opinions in the medical treatment cases reflected this increased
awareness among the public at large. In medical treatment cases, courts rested
their analyses on a person’s right to self-determination. As the court announced
in Natanson, “each man is considered to be the master of his own body, and he
may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving
surgery or other medical treatment.”229
In criminal confession cases, courts note extensively the historic lessons from
unjust methods of interrogation against the accused.230 Decided during the Civil
Rights Movement in the 1960s, the Miranda case cited contemporaneous reports
of police resorting to brutal tactics to obtain coerced confessions.231

222. Eric J. Segall, The Skeptic’s Constitution, Remnants of Belief: Contemporary
Constitutional Issues by Louis Michael Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet (Oxford University Press
1996), 44 UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1504 (1997) (pointing out that judicial decision-making changes
reflect evolving societal understandings).
223. Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4
YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 311, 322–23 (1992).
224. Id.
225. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 47, at 87 (suggesting that the increased legal interest
in the right of self-determination reflected the social movements at the time).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Szczygiel, supra note 94 at 193–95 (describing a cancer study involving doctors injecting
live cancer cells into chronically sick patients without the patients’ consent and other experiments
including the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment).
229. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104.
230. Brown, 161 U.S. at 596–97.
231. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445–46.
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In the economic arena, business practices have changed as well because of
technological advances and the pivot to digital commerce.232 Businesses have
been relying on standard and online forms which have been enforced by the
courts even though there is no meaningful consent. Although many legal
scholars have been critical of the courts’ consent approach, those practices have
not generated outrage equal to that which followed reports of abuse in medical
experiments or confessions compelled by police brutality.
D. Human Cognitive Biases and Consent Jurisprudence
Judicial resistance to change in contract disputes may also be explained by the
mere fact that judges are human beings with flawed human decision-making
processes. During the last few decades, scientific studies have shown humans
often make decisions automatically based on intuition (referred to as System 1)
unless something triggers a more deliberate thinking process (referred to as
System 2).233 System 1 thinking relies on mental shortcuts and coherence to
make decisions.234 System 2 thinking is more deliberate and is triggered only
when our brain is stimulated by jarring reminders.235
In contract disputes, the simple consent approach is more consistent with
judges’ and society’s beliefs about individual autonomy and freedom of
contract.236 Judges have often declined to scrutinize contract parties’ agreement
because of deference to parties’ freedom to contract.237 Judges lack reminders
to engage in more deliberate thinking, i.e., heightened scrutiny of consent.238
Indeed, it is easier for judges to indulge in the consent fiction than to challenge
it because the simple consent approach will lead to a finding of a valid contract
while a heightened inquiry would result in a finding of an invalid contract.239
In medical treatment and criminal confessions, medical abuses and police
brutality serve as powerful reminders for judges to question the assertion of
consent.240 That reality is inconsistent with the judges’ own belief system and

232. Marks, supra note 64, at 499.
233. See Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions, supra note 9, at 395–400 (for a
detailed description of System 1 versus System 2 thinking and common cognitive biases that human
beings suffer) and references therein.
234. Id. at 396.
235. Id. at 396–97.
236. Id. at 416; Leonhard, Unbearable Lightness of Consent, supra note 2, at 64−65; White,
supra note 19, at 138–39.
237. See Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions, supra note 9, at 415–17 for a detailed
analysis on why it is easier for the judges to stay with the simple consent approach.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 416.
240. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445–46; New York v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857, 857 (1965).
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therefore, triggers a more deliberate thinking process which forces judges to
examine if consenting parties actually consented.241
Thus, social science research shows, the human decision-making process will
lead to a heightened consent scrutiny in medical treatment or criminal confession
cases. System 1 intuitive thinking will warn judges automatically against the
dangers of consent in medical treatment and criminal confession cases. There is
universal agreement that it is wrong to experiment on people or to use
confessions against them without their consent. Therefore, it is easier for judges
to apply heightened scrutiny of consent because that approach is more coherent
with the universal (and with judges’) world view.242 These jarring reminders do
not exist in contract disputes. In fact, the opposite is true. Powerful business
interests benefit from the simple consent approach and have been promoting the
underlying economic theories to justify the judicial approach.243
CONCLUSION
This brief overview of selected case law from the late 19th century until the
present shows that courts have approached the factual question of consent
differently in the three selected areas. In contract law, courts have retained the
original 19th century focus and are limiting inquiry to identifying observable
verbal or non-verbal communications of consent. In contrast, in both medical
treatment and confession cases, courts’ search for consent evolved from an
initial focus on observable signs of consent⎯verbal or non-verbal
communications⎯to an inquiry into the quality of consent. In those two areas,
courts are not relying on observable signs of consent and have adopted the
informed consent doctrine, albeit phrased differently in criminal confession
cases.
The most dramatic consent approach is Miranda’s presumption of nonconsent in a custodial interrogation. The Miranda standard rejects observable
signs of consent⎯the voluntary act of making or signing a confession⎯in a
custodial interrogation where police failed to provide necessary information for
the accused to make an informed decision.

241. Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions, supra note 9, at 405 (“In sum, legal
fictions that have some built-in reminders are benign because the reminders serve to activate
System 2 thinking, resulting in better decision making.”).
242. See id. at 417.
The consent concept in many ways allows us to embrace a world view coherent with
the ideal image that we would like to have. And coherence is the guiding principle
underlying the maintenance of “quick judgment” System 1 heuristic thinking. Judges,
like all other humans, have a strong need for coherence. Respect for consent means
respect for our individualism and autonomy. Judges intuitively rely on consent as the
basis for enforcing agreements when there is nothing reminding them that signature,
clicking, and browsing are only reifications of consent, not complete proof of actual
consent. Id.
243. White, supra note 19, at 149–50.
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These differences can be partially explained based on different roles consent
plays in each context and social changes over the examined period. Heightened
consent inquiry reflects judicial bias in favor of stronger protection of individual
rights to bodily integrity, self-determination, and liberty and protection against
arbitrary government power. In addition, the divergent approaches may reflect
human cognitive biases in judicial decision-making process.
This overview across time and context offers a few insights about judicial
consent jurisprudence. First, courts have clearly recognized that verbal and nonverbal communications of consent do not necessarily reflect internal mental
processes and reliance on observable signs of consent may not promote
individual autonomy in some situations. Courts have rejected the simple consent
approach in at least two areas⎯medical treatment and criminal confession cases.
Second, courts are willing and able to fashion different standards to ascertain
consent. They adopted a heightened standard of consent when interests at stake
are deemed more important⎯right to bodily integrity, individual liberty, and
protection from arbitrary government power. In sum, this overview shows that
United States courts are capable of calibrating their consent approach to search
for informed consent—if they are willing.
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